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Insurance. An ingenious modern game of chance in which the
player is permitted to enjoy the comfortable conviction that he is beating
1
the man who keeps the table.
I. INTRODUCTION
Read now, Ambrose Bierce’s infamous definition of insurance falls
short of the mark; players in today’s insurance game do not even have
“the comfortable conviction” that an insurer will welcome its contractual
2
3
duties to defend and indemnify.
The Minnesota Supreme Court
† J.D. Candidate 2004, William Mitchell College of Law; B.A. History, Rice
University, cum laude, 1999.
1. AMBROSE BIERCE, THE DEVIL’S DICTIONARY (Oxford University Press 1999)
(1911).
2. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 523 (7th ed. 1999) (defining the “duty to defend”
clause in a liability insurance contract as that which obligates the insurer to “take over the
defense of any lawsuit brought by a third party against the insured on a claim that falls
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recently revisited the question of insurance coverage in Thommes v.
4
Milwaukee Insurance Co., which involved a commercial general
5
liability (CGL) policy. As formally defined, CGL insurance is a class of
insurance “that covers damages that the insured becomes legally
obligated to pay to a third party because of bodily injury or property
6
damage.” Yet given the broad opening provision of a standard CGL
contract, CGL insurance’s relatively narrow scope is not immediately
apparent; a CGL insurer “will pay those sums that the insured becomes
legally obligated to pay as damages because of ‘bodily injury’ or
7
‘property damage’ to which this insurance applies.” A CGL policy
within the policy’s coverage”). The duty to defend forms a crucial component of
Comprehensive General Liability (CGL) coverage because “[w]hether a contractor
lacking the resources necessary for protracted litigation can shift the cost of defending a
counterclaim to the insurer may color or even determine the outcome” of a litigation. F.
Malcolm Cunningham, Jr. & Amy L. Fischer, Insurance Coverage in Construction—The
Unanswered Question, 33 TORT & INS. L.J. 1063, 1081 (1998).
3. BLACK’S, supra note 2, at 772 (defining “indemnify” as to “reimburse (another)
for a loss suffered because of a third party’s act or default”). The duties to defend and
indemnify are considered to be the two primary duties that an insurer owes its insured. 4
PHILIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. O’CONNOR, BRUNER & O’CONNOR ON CONSTRUCTION
LAW § 11:19 (2002 & Supp. 2003) [hereinafter BRUNER & O’CONNOR]. The duty to
defend is broader than the duty to indemnify in the sense that, even if an action that leads
to a judgment against an insured turns out not to be covered, an insurer still may have
been “obligated to defend its insured if one or more of the allegations in the complaint
fall within coverage.” Id.
4. 641 N.W.2d 877 (Minn. 2002).
5. See generally 7 LEE R. RUSS ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE § 129:11 (3d ed.
1999 & Supp. 2003). As one commentator recounts, CGL used to stand for
“comprehensive,” but changed to “commercial” in 1986; this is considered to be
emblematic of the narrowing of coverage over the years. Kenneth S. Abraham, The Rise
and Fall of Commercial Liability Insurance, 87 VA. L. REV. 85, 89 (2001).
6. BLACK’S, supra note 2, at 809. CGL is one of multiple forms of insurance on a
construction project. See 4 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 3, § 11:1. As opposed to
CGL coverage for third party property, the owner of what is being worked on “often
carries [first] party property coverage, generally in the form of a builder’s risk policy.”
Id. The coverages carried by contractors and subcontractors are required by either state
law, such as workers compensation coverage, or the parties’ contracts, such as CGL
coverage, along with automobile liability and contractual liability insurance. See id.
“Most contractors also carry excess or umbrella policies providing insurance for covered
losses that exceed the limits of their primary coverage.” Id.
7. Insurance Services Office, Inc. (ISO) Commercial General Liability Form No.
CG 00 02 07 98 [hereinafter CGL Policy]. The standard form policy provides that
liability insurance does not cover:
That particular part of real property on which you or any contractors
working directly or indirectly on your behalf are performing
operations if the [third party’s property damage claim] arises out of
those operations or
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must realize the narrower purpose thrashed out for it through specialized
8
9
It is upon these exclusions that the
definitions and exclusions.
Thommes decision turned. In the process of contending with the
particular exclusions raised, the Thommes court forestalled one internal
contradiction about the timing of damages but disregarded a second on
how a CGL contract should be adjudicated.
10
Coverage under a CGL contract is determined as a matter of law.

That particular part of any property that must be restored, repaired or
replaced because “your work” was incorrectly performed on it . . . .
“Property damage” to “your work” arising out of it or any part of it
and included in the [complete operations hazard coverage] . . . .
[Property damage claims] arising out of:
(1) A defect, deficiency, inadequacy or dangerous condition in “your
product” or “your work” or
(2) A delay or failure by you or anyone acting on your behalf to
perform a contract or agreement in accordance with its terms.
This exclusion does not apply to the loss of use of other property
arising out of sudden and accidental physical injury to “your product”
or “your work” after it has been put to its intended use.
Damages claimed for any loss, cost or expense insured by you or
others for the loss of use, withdrawal, recall, inspection, repair,
replacement, adjustment, removal or disposal of
(1) “your product”
(2) “your work” or
(3) “impaired property”
if such product, work, or property is withdrawn or recalled from the
market or from use by any person or organization because of a known
or suspected defect, deficiency, inadequacy or dangerous condition in
it.
Keith A. Dotseth et al., Evolution or Revolution: Thommes’ Role in the Development of
the Business Risk Doctrine, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 597, 599-600 (2002) (citing
JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, INTERPRETATION OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS § T4.2 (1994) (quoting
INSURANCE SERVICE OFFICE, COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY FORM CG-00-01-11-88
(1988), reprinted in ALLIANCE OF AMERICAN INSURERS, POLICY KIT FOR STUDENTS OF
INSURANCE 186-87 (1990) (paragraph labels omitted)).
8. An insurance policy commonly defines operative terms to achieve narrower
coverage. 4 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 3, at § 11:11. “[I]t is possible that the same
term may have different meanings depending upon the section of the policy in which it is
found. If a term is not defined, then to the extent that it is clear and unambiguous, it is
given its plain, ordinary and popular sense.” Id.
9. Though a standard insurance policy has standard exclusions, it may be tailored
to increase or restrict coverage depending on the needs of a specific insured through the
use of endorsements. 4 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 3, § 11:13.
10. Thommes, 641 N.W.2d at 879.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2003

3

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 12
12 SOLON- PAGINATED.DOC

676

1/13/2004 3:45 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:2

To interpret policies and their exclusions, courts examine not only the
four corners of the document but also often reach beyond the document
11
to what is known as the “business risk doctrine.” The general concept
behind the business risk doctrine is that an insured “should not look to its
12
CGL insurer to cover business risks that are within its own control.”
As one commentator has elaborated:
The risk of replacing and repairing defective materials or poor
workmanship has generally been considered a commercial risk
which is not passed on to the liability insurer. Rather liability
coverage [through a CGL policy] comes into play when the
insured’s defective materials or work cause injury to property
13
other than the insured’s own work.
In effect, a court that follows the business risk doctrine is to make a
distinction between tort and contract claims; CGL policies provide
coverage to an insured for tort claims from third parties, but not for
contract liability arising from damages on the insured’s customer’s
14
property.
Whether the business risk doctrine merely aids the courts as an
interpretative device or risks supplanting a contract’s actual language is a
15
matter of controversy. Regardless of which side one takes, however,
11. It has been remarked that if you “[t]urn the CGL policy upside down and shake
it vigorously . . . [w]hat won’t shake out is the ‘business risk doctrine.’ ” James Duffy
O’Connor, What Every Construction Lawyer Should Know About CGL Coverage for
Defective Construction, 21 CONSTRUCTION LAW 15, 15 (2001).
12. Id.
13. Robert J. Franco, Insurance Coverage for Faulty Workmanship Claims Under
Commercial General Liability Policies, 30 TORT & INS. L.J. 785, 787 (1995).
14. Dotseth et al., supra note 7, at 601. One commentator has argued that the
distinction between tort (covered) and contract (not covered) claims has little or no
logical basis in fact because both arise from negligent or somehow defective work. See
Clifford J. Shapiro, Further Reflections—Inadvertent Construction Defects Are an
“Occurrence” under Commercial General Liability Policies, 686 PLI/LIT 73, 98 (2003);
see also O’Connor, supra note 11, at 18. “So what that the insured was negligent? Isn’t
that exactly why consumers buy insurance? . . . It is precisely to cover the risk that each
of these insureds will fail to act in a reasonably prudent manner on occasion that each
buys general liability insurance.” Id. Nevertheless, it is possible for a “contractual
liability coverage” provision to be added to a CGL policy. See 7 RUSS, supra note 5, at §
103:19.
15. See 4 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 3, at § 11:37. “The problem with
employing a ‘business risk’ concept in a coverage analysis is the danger that
preconceived notions as to what risks insurance is intended to cover can distract one from
objectively interpreting policy language.” Id. “The ‘business risk’ concept plays a more
subtle interpretative role in jurisdictions that have not elevated it to a doctrine. In many
cases, the concept is used to ‘explain’ the meaning of exclusionary language. This is
often done in the guise of engaging in an objective interpretation of policy language.
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the reality is that since the business risk doctrine came to be recognized
just over thirty years ago, a court’s incorporation of it into a decision has
16
usually meant that an insured does not get coverage—until now.
In a striking reversal of fortune, the Minnesota Supreme Court in
Thommes held that the intent of the business risk doctrine rendered a
CGL policy’s language ambiguous and, as a result, the contract had to be
17
construed in favor of the insured to provide coverage. Yet given how
earlier Minnesota cases presented the business risk doctrine, it is unclear
on the face of the case how the court reached its decision. As originally
formulated, the business risk doctrine dictated that a CGL policy should
18
cover only tort liability for completed work that causes damages.
Thommes did indeed involve tort, but for damages that arose during the
19
course of the insured’s work.
By nevertheless allowing coverage,
Thommes set forth a rule that the risk intended to be insured is for tort
20
liability, no matter at what point it arises.
Without broadcasting it,
Thommes’ disregard for timing broke away from the rote formulation of
the business risk doctrine.
Thommes’ revision of the business risk doctrine must be inferred. It

Yet, the ‘business risk’ rule is an insurance industry trade concept. By employing the
‘business risk’ rule to interpret exclusionary language, courts in reality are applying a
‘custom and usage’ process to determine the extent of coverage. Unfortunately, most
insureds are not steeped in industry practice.” Id.
16. See 4 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 3, at § 11:37; see also O’Connor,
supra note 11, at 15 (characterizing the business risk doctrine as a “tried and true
weapon” of the insurance industry and “the main obstacle” to property damage
coverage).
17. See Thommes, 641 N.W.2d 877, 883 (Minn. 2002). See also 27 DUNNELL
MINN. DIGEST Insurance § 19.01(b) (4th ed. 1995) (stating Minnesota law as it currently
stands on the issue of CGL coverage for third-party tort liability claims: “A contractor’s
general liability policy provides coverage for insurance risks, but not business risks.
Where the insured’s defective work causes property damage or personal injury to a third
party, however, the third-party claim is covered by the policy and is not barred by the
business risk doctrine.” (citing Sphere Drake Ins. Co. v. Tremco Inc., 513 N.W.2d 473
(Minn. Ct. App. 1994)).
18. Roger C. Henderson, Insurance Protection for Products Liability and
Completed Operations—What Every Lawyer Should Know, 50 NEB. L. REV. 415, 441
(1971).
19. Thommes, 641 N.W.2d at 879.
20. The Thommes court essentially based its decision granting coverage as an
attempt to follow the dictates of “the underlying purpose of CGL insurance.” Id. at 883.
The underlying purpose, as the court saw it, was to cover the risk that an insured’s work
will cause property damage to a third party’s property that “may give rise to tort
liability.” Id. at 881 (citing Bor-Son Bldg. Corp. v. Employers Commercial Union Ins.
Co., 323 N.W.2d 58, 63-64 (Minn. 1982)). The court did not qualify this statement with
any timing considerations. Id.
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is therefore unclear whether the court changed the formulation of the
business risk doctrine intentionally or unconsciously. Although the court
in Thommes closely split over the holding, neither the majority opinion
21
nor the dissent mentioned the issue of timing.
It appears that this
disregard of timing reflects what the court—both majority and dissent—
understood the business risk doctrine to mean all along, rendering a
change within Thommes unconscious. Thus, even should either side
reflect that Thommes did effect a change, neither would be prompted to
reverse itself. Thommes’ significance lies in the fact that the court finally
managed to state what it thought.
Tracking the Minnesota courts’ wording of the business risk
doctrine, however, also reveals an intrinsic conundrum. On the one
hand, coverage under a CGL contract is supposed to be decided as a
22
matter of law. Yet on the other hand, whether a tort such as negligence
23
is committed is primarily a question of fact. According to the business
risk doctrine, insureds cannot receive coverage for damages from risks
24
they could have avoided. Whether a risk is avoidable usually comes
down to whether or not the insured was negligent, inherently involving a
25
question of fact. The business risk doctrine can never be fully realized
as long as the doctrine thrusts courts into the position of having to decide
questions of fact as a matter of law.
This note first examines the theory behind the business risk doctrine
26
in analyzing CGL insurance.
It then details the supreme court’s
27
28
holding in Thommes, followed by an analysis of that decision.
Finally, the note concludes that, whatever problems may exist, the court

21. Justice Page wrote the majority opinion. Justice Stringer wrote the dissent,
joined by Chief Justice Blatz and Justice Paul H. Anderson. Id. at 884-85. Because the
majority saw the underlying purpose of CGL insurance as a blanket means to cover
potential tort liability to third parties, the majority’s opinion did not contain any timing
qualifications. Id. at 881-83. The dissent did not dispute the majority’s characterization
of the purpose of CGL insurance; rather, the dissent faulted the majority for relying on a
conception of CGL insurance in place of the contract’s actual language. Id. at 884-85.
22. Id. at 879 (citing Am. Family Ins. Co. v. Walser, 628 N.W.2d 605, 609 (Minn.
2001) and Haarstad v. Graff, 517 N.W.2d 582, 584 (Minn. 1994)).
23. Glatt v. Feist, 156 N.W.2d 819, 823 (N.D. 1968).
24. O’Connor, supra note 11, at 15.
25. In Minnesota, a CGL policy may be interpreted to cover negligence, but not
intentional torts. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Terrace Enters., Inc., 260 N.W.2d 450, 453 (Minn.
1977).
26. See infra Part II.
27. See infra Part III.
28. See infra Part IV.
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29

has devised a manageable approach to CGL insurance coverage.
II. HISTORY

A CGL contract is the most common of the insurance industry’s
30
standard policy forms.
Standard insurance forms usually originate
from the Insurance Services Office, Inc. (ISO), an organization supported
31
The first CGL policy was developed in
by the insurance industry.
32
1940; major revisions occurred in 1943, 1955, 1966, 1973, and 1986.
In 1971, Roger C. Henderson, a tort scholar who was then an
associate professor at the Nebraska School of Law, produced an article
33
that is credited with first articulating the business risk doctrine. The
phrase “business risk” did not originate with him, but with an exclusion
34
that the insurance industry added to the CGL policy in 1966. In the
most influential section of the article, Henderson wrote that “[t]he risk
intended to be insured is the possibility that the . . . work of the insured,
once relinquished or completed, will cause . . . damage to property other
than to the . . . completed work itself, and for which the insured may be
35
found liable.” It is ironic that Henderson is known for articulating the
29. See infra Part V.
30. 4 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 3, at § 11:18. See generally Abraham,
supra note 5 (discussing the history and development of CGL insurance since its origins
in the nineteenth century).
31. 4 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 3, at § 11:6.
32. Id. Reportedly, the CGL exclusions were narrowed over the years specifically
to broaden coverage; insurance company publications made this clear. Yet “[d]espite the
revised policy exclusions, or perhaps because of them, insurance companies are asserting
new grounds for denying coverage.” Shapiro, supra note 14, at 79, 96. See also 4
BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 3, at § 11:28.
33. Henderson, supra note 18, at 441. Henderson is currently a Professor of Law at
the University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law.
34. Id. at 438. Today, the standard CGL policy is generally considered to have five
business risk exclusions—2j, 2k, 2l, 2m, and 2n—that could be subject to interpretation
through the business risk doctrine. See 4 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 3, at § 11:37.
In reality, exclusion j contains six subdivisions, two of which—j(5) and j(6)—operate as
individual business risk exclusions. Id. These two, along with exclusion l, will be
discussed later. See infra Part III.A. 2k excludes from coverage “ ‘[p]roperty damage’ to
‘your product’ arising out of it or any part of it.” Id. 2m excludes damage to impaired
property or property not physically injured. 2n excludes damage from having to recall
products or somehow fix work done. Id.; see also Gregory G. Schultz, Commercial
General Liability Coverage of Faulty Construction Claims, 33 TORT & INS. L.J. 257, 266
(1997).
35. Henderson, supra note 18, at 441. Henderson understood the rationale for the
business risk exclusion to be that “the risks of . . . property damage arising from the
planning stage of business are a business risk of the insured, that is, a responsibility
which he must undertake just as he does for other business decisions.” Id. at 440.
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business risk doctrine because his article was written in part to criticize
36
the 1966 revision. Nevertheless, it is his formulation of how a business
risk exclusion operates, not his criticism, that has carried the day. On the
basis of this key passage, courts began to turn to the business risk
doctrine to resolve questions of CGL coverage depending on whether the
37
liability arose from tort or from contract.
What influence the Henderson article has enjoyed until now appears
to be due to the even more influential CGL decision that was cited it,
38
Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc. In Weedo, the New Jersey Supreme Court
dealt with one construction company that had two claims brought against
39
Both
it under two different insurance companies’ CGL policies.
involved claims of defective work: cracking stucco that had to be
40
replaced and faulty roofing and gutter work.
First, the Weedo court
recounted how the appellate court ruled that the insurers were obliged to
defend their insured because “certain exclusions of the policy, when read
together, were ambiguous and hence had to be resolved against the
41
insurer.” Then, signaling the new age, the New Jersey Supreme Court
quoted at length from Henderson to embrace the distinction between
42
contract and tort. The Weedo court reasoned that “the replacement or
repair of faulty goods and works is a business expense, to be borne by
43
the insured-contractor.” This left the court to conclude that “injury to
persons and damage to other property constitute the risks intended to be
44
covered under the CGL [policy].”
Minnesota is one of several jurisdictions that have adopted the
45
approach of the New Jersey Supreme Court. So much so, it has been
36. Id. at 441. Indeed, Henderson wrote that “the insurance industry would do well
to eliminate the ‘Business Risk’ exclusion.” Id.
37. Dotseth et al., supra note 7, at 598. The distinction that courts make between
contract and tort has been criticized. Id. The continuing influence of Henderson’s article
for this idea has been criticized in particular: “The danger in relying upon an article
written in 1971 is that the insurance industry and the coverages it markets have changed
dramatically since the 1966 policy form, which was the subject of the [Henderson]
article.” 4 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 3, at § 11:28.
38. 405 A.2d 788 (N.J. 1979).
39. Id. at 789.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 791.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 792.
45. See, e.g., Ind. Ins. Co. v. DeZutti, 408 N.E.2d 1275 (Ind. 1980); Peerless Ins.
Co. v. Brennon, 564 A.2d 383 (Me. 1989); Fisher v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 579
N.W.2d 599 (N.D. 1998); Vernon Williams & Son Constr., Inc. v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 591
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said, that Minnesota is perhaps the jurisdiction most closely identified
46
The first Minnesota decision that
with the business risk doctrine.
manifested the doctrine’s presence was the state supreme court’s 1982
decision in Bor-Son Building Corp. v. Employers Commercial Union
47
Insurance Co. of America. Bor-Son involved a landowner bringing suit
against a general contractor who had constructed a building, claiming
48
faulty workmanship and materials. Though the contractor had a CGL
policy, the supreme court ruled that the insurer had no duty to defend
49
because the damages arose out of the contractor’s breach of contract.
The building owner had not received the product “for which it had
50
bargained.” In laying out the business risk doctrine, the court quoted
Henderson’s formulation word for word—the same passage cited in
51
Weedo—rather than somehow restating it.
In 1986, the supreme court was willing to elaborate this formulation
52
in Knutson Construction Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.
Like Bor-Son, Knutson arose from a claim by a property owner against a
53
general contractor for faulty workmanship and defective materials.
The court affirmed its earlier ruling in Bor-Son, holding that the
contractor had no CGL coverage because the claims derived from breach
54
of contract. Yet even though Knutson quoted the same passage from
55
Henderson as Bor-Son, the reasoning within Knutson did deviate from
the mantra of “once relinquished or completed.” Apparently without
realizing what would contradict its earlier quoted passage, the court
stated, lost in a long paragraph, that a CGL policy could shift the risk to
the insurer for tort liability for that period “during the course of the work
56
or, if a completed operations endorsement is paid for, thereafter.” A
determination as to whether the supreme court realized it had laid the
groundwork for a potential contradiction about timing had to wait for
S.W.2d 760 (Tenn. 1979); Erie Ins. Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Pioneer Home Improvement,
Inc., 526 S.E.2d 28 (W. Va. 1999). See also Donald M. Zupanec, Annotation, Scope of
Clause Excluding from Contractor’s or Similar Liability Policy, 8 A.L.R.4th 563 (1981)
(discussing insurance exclusions from contractor’s coverage in different jurisdictions).
46. 4 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 3, at § 11:37.
47. 323 N.W.2d 58 (Minn. 1982).
48. Bor-Son, 323 N.W.2d at 59-60.
49. Id. at 63.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. 396 N.W.2d 229 (Minn. 1986).
53. Id. at 231.
54. Id. at 235.
55. Id. at 232.
56. Id. at 234 (emphasis added).
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Thommes, a case that involved tort liability to a third party.
III. THE THOMMES DECISION
A. Facts
Thommes & Thomas Land Clearing (Thommes) is a partnership
57
In September
that clears and grubs land for construction projects.
1996, Thommes subcontracted to clear and grub land for a commercial
development owned by Dean Morlock, Charles Vig, and HHA
58
Development. Adjoining the land to be cleared lay property owned by
59
Morlock’s sister and her husband, Donna and John Krajewski. It was
not until Thommes had cleared portions of the land that belonged to the
Krajewskis that it found out it had damaged property belonging to a third
60
party.
In response to impending litigation by the Krajewskis, Thomas
Benick, a partner of Thommes, made a handwritten statement about what
61
had happened.
According to this statement, it was “[a]bout halfway
through the job” of clearing land on the development that Thommes
62
started clearing land near the Krajewskis’ property. Where the
development ended and the Krajewskis’ land began was unclear because
no one had provided Thommes with written instructions. Further, unlike
63
the rest of the property, no survey stakes marked the property lines.
Benick asked Morlock how close they should clear to the
64
Krajewskis’ property. As Benick later recalled, Morlock “pointed and
65
made a line” and said to clear everything out. Benick recounted that
the land in question “looked like an area maintained by the homeowner
[of the adjoining property]” and, as a result, “[he] questioned Morlock
because it appeared [he] would be taking trees off the property” owned
66
by the Krajewskis. Benick remembered Morlock saying not to worry
57. Thommes v. Milwaukee Ins. Co., 641 N.W.2d 877, 879 (Minn. 2002).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Thommes v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 622 N.W.2d 155, 157 (Minn. Ct. App.
2001), aff’d 641 N.W.2d 877 (Minn. 2002).
61. Handwritten statement of Thomas Benick, Partner of Thommes & Thomas
Land Clearing, Concerning the HHA Project (July 11, 1998) (on file with author).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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because it was his sister’s house and she and her husband were away on
67
vacation. Still hesitant, Benick consulted with Knutson’s construction
68
supervisor, the contractor who had hired Thommes as a subcontractor.
After the Knutson supervisor walked down the same area and Benick
showed him what Morlock told Benick to do, the supervisor also said
69
“do it.”
Benick estimated that the process of clearing this portion of the land
“could have taken one week,” leaving Morlock plenty of opportunity to
correct any error, but Thommes’ work continued uninterrupted until the
70
Krajewskis came back home.
After finding out that Thommes had
indeed cut too far, Benick met with John Krajewski and Morlock, at
71
which point Morlock denied ever having told Thommes to go so far.
By the end of the confrontation, Benick had agreed to look for
72
replacement trees. Afterward, however, as Benick recalled it, Morlock
told him not to plant the trees until he, Morlock, had finished grading the
73
land. It is at this point that Benick wrote in his statement, “I thought
74
this whole event was fishy . . . .” Benick recorded his newfound belief
that Morlock knew the Krajewskis’ land had to be graded to finish his
development, but that Morlock had not been able to get his brother-in75
law’s consent.
After the Krajewskis brought an action against Thommes for
damage to their property, Thommes tendered defense to its CGL
76
insurance carrier, Milwaukee Insurance Co. (Milwaukee). Milwaukee,
however, declined either to defend or indemnify Thommes based on two
77
78
exclusions in the policy, 2j(5) and 2j(6). 2j(5) stated that coverage
67. Id.
68. Id. at 2.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 3.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Thommes v. Milwaukee Ins. Co., 641 N.W.2d 877, 879 (Minn. 2002).
77. See Abraham, supra note 5, at 104-05. “[T]he current trend . . . is toward ever
more narrow CGL coverage. The original ‘comprehensive’ general liability insurance
policy contained only five exclusions. Over time the exclusions have proliferated.
Today there are a minimum of fifteen exclusions in the standard-form CGL policy,
occupying nearly four pages of fine print.” Id.
78. Thommes, 641 N.W.2d at 879. See generally 9 LEE R. RUSS ET AL., COUCH ON
INSURANCE § 129:12 (3d ed. 1997) (discussing exclusions 2j(5) and 2j(6)). If available,
an insured may purchase a contractor’s rework endorsement for “the insured’s repair,
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does not apply to “‘[p]roperty damage’ to . . . [t]hat particular part of real
property on which you . . . are performing operations, if the ‘property
79
damage’ arises out of those operations.” 2j(6) stated that neither was
there coverage for “ ‘property damage’ to . . . [t]hat particular part of any
property that must be restored, repaired, or replaced because ‘your . . .
80
work’ was incorrectly performed on it.”
B. The Court’s Analysis
The trial court granted Milwaukee’s summary judgment motion
after concluding that “the plain language” of the CGL policy denied
81
Reversing on appeal, the court of appeals held that “the
coverage.
policy exclusions at issue are business risk exclusions that do not apply
82
to injured third parties . . . .” For its part, the supreme court began its
decision by duly noting that the “interpretation of an insurance policy is a
83
question of law reviewed de novo” and that “[i]nsurance contract
84
exclusions are construed strictly against the insurer.”
Moving on to its analysis, the court cited Bor-Son for the
85
proposition that there are two types of risk that a contractor faces. The
first type is that an insured may be liable through contract for defective
work, in which case the business risk doctrine operates to exclude
86
coverage. The second type includes the risk that a contractor’s work
87
will cause “property damage to other property.” The court continued,
“it was this type of risk, which may give rise to tort liability to third
replacement, alteration, and/or removal” of defective work. “Depending upon how the
coverage is written, it can significantly narrow or eliminate the j(5) and j(6) exclusions
contained in the standard CGL policy.” Patrick J. O’Connor, Jr., Commercial General
Liability Coverage, 19 CONSTRUCTION LAW 5, 15 (Apr. 1999) [hereinafter O’Connor,
Liability Coverage].
79. Thommes, 641 N.W.2d at 882.
80. Id. at 883.
81. Thommes v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., No. C-1999-22166, slip op. at 7 (Scott
County Dist. Ct. June 13, 2000).
82. Thommes v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 622 N.W.2d 155, 157 (Minn. Ct. App.
2001).
83. Thommes v. Milwaukee Ins. Co., 641 N.W.2d 877, 879 (Minn. 2002). The
question of whether an insurer has a duty to defend or indemnify is also a question of law
reviewed de novo. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Miller, 589 N.W.2d 297, 299 (Minn.
1999).
84. Thommes, 641 N.W.2d at 880 (citing Am. Family Ins. Co. v. Walser, 628
N.W.2d 605, 613 (Minn. 2001)).
85. Thommes, 641 N.W.2d at 881.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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parties,” against which CGL policies were intended to insure.
In
contrast to its earlier decisions on CGL coverage, the court quoted
89
Henderson only by way of quoting Bor-Son.
Toward the beginning of its opinion, the court disclaimed slavish
90
adherence to the business risk doctrine. Reviewing its past decisions in
Bor-Son and Knutson, the court commented: “[W]e used business risk
principles as a means of illuminating the underlying purpose of CGL
insurance. Notably absent from [these decisions] is any indication that
these principles serve as the foundation for a separate ‘business risk
doctrine’ that operates to override the express language of policy
91
exclusions.”
Nevertheless, when considering the first exclusion at
issue, 2j(5), the court reasoned that the “underlying purpose of CGL
92
insurance” rendered the exclusion ambiguous.
Once the court found
the exclusion ambiguous, it only needed to recite that “contract
exclusions are to be construed strictly against the insurer” to hold that
93
there was coverage.
When it came to the other provision at issue, 2j(6), the court
94
produced a slightly different analysis.
Instead of the business risk
doctrine alone being sufficient to render the provision ambiguous, the
95
court found multiple meanings within the policy’s actual language.
The court reasoned that the word “incorrect” could mean not only the
manner in which work was conducted, but also the place where it was
96
conducted. Because the court could foresee multiple meanings, it came
to the same conclusion that the exclusion was ambiguous and must be

88. Id. The court does, however, admit the possibility that an insurer and insured
could contract otherwise for different coverage. Id. at 882 (citing Am. Family Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Ryan, 330 N.W.2d 113, 115 (Minn. 1983)).
89. Id. at 881.
90. Id. at 880.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 883.
93. Id. The court relied on recent precedent stating that exclusions in insurance
contracts are construed strictly against the insurer. Am. Family Ins. Co. v. Walser, 628
N.W.2d 605, 609 (Minn. 2001). See also Nathe Bros. v. Am. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 615
N.W.2d 341, 344 (Minn. 2000). “Because most insurance policies are presented as
preprinted forms, which a potential insured must usually accept or reject as a whole,
ambiguities in a policy are generally resolved in favor of the insured.” Id. Nevertheless,
when an insurance contract uses unambiguous language, the contract is given its plain
and ordinary meaning. Medica, Inc. v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 566 N.W.2d 74, 77 (Minn.
1997).
94. Thommes, 641 N.W.2d at 883-84.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 883.
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97

construed against the insurer to order coverage. Yet even though the
court found 2j(6) ambiguous on its face, the court would have applied the
98
same analysis as it had for 2j(5), had it been necessary.
Thus, the
majority’s holding that the mere “purpose” of CGL insurance makes a
contract clause fatally ambiguous inhabits the whole case. In effect,
Thommes ruled that if an insured’s work may give rise to tort liability to
99
third parties, then a CGL policy provides coverage.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE THOMMES DECISION
A. The Missing Step
What is noticeably absent from the Thommes decision is the passage
from Henderson, as quoted in Weedo, that had been cited in prior
100
This absence, if not intentional,
Minnesota CGL coverage decisions.
was certainly convenient, as it allowed the Minnesota Supreme Court to
avoid a previous oversight in reasoning that would have become a fullblown internal contradiction in Thommes.
All three of the courts that adjudicated the Thommes case on its way
up the chain—the district court, the court of appeals, and the supreme
court—launched into an analysis of 2j(5) and 2j(6) without pausing to
101
comment on why these exclusions in particular were at issue.
Of
course, from the time when a claim on the policy was first made,
Milwaukee settled upon 2j(5) and 2j(6) as the basis for denying
102
coverage.
Perhaps each court only decided to refrain from interfering
97. Id. at 884.
98. Id. (Stringer, J., dissenting). It is for this reason that, when speaking of the
whole case, the Thommes dissent states that “[t]he ambiguity found by the majority
regarding whether the exclusion applies to property owned by third parties comes not
from the language of the exclusion, but rather from the majority’s conception of the
underlying purpose of CGL insurance . . . .” Id.
99. Id. at 883.
100. See Bor-Son Bldg. Corp. v. Employers Commercial Union Ins. Co. of Am., 323
N.W.2d 58, 62 (Minn. 1982); Knutson, 396 N.W.2d at 232.
101. Thommes v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., No. C-1999-22166, slip op. at 7 (Scott
County Dist. Ct. June 13, 2000). The district court’s memorandum states flatly that “there
is no issue that the language of either exclusion 2j(5) or 2j(6) is ambiguous.” Id. The
court of appeals framed the issue outright as whether exclusions 2j(5) and 2j(6) barred
coverage. Thommes, 622 N.W.2d at 157. Similarly, in the supreme court’s decision, the
court wrote that “[t]he question here is whether the damage to the Krajewskis’ property is
excluded from coverage by section 2j(5) or section 2j(6)”—not which exclusions might
exclude coverage. See Thommes, 641 N.W.2d at 882.
102. Thommes, 622 N.W.2d at 157.
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with Milwaukee’s choice in defenses. Nevertheless, such cryptic writing
by the courts means that the reasoning that went into accepting 2j(5) and
2j(6) as the exclusions in play must be deduced.
If the Thommes court had taken a step back to examine afresh all the
exclusions in the policy, the initial uncertainty would have centered on
whether 2l—another standard CGL policy exclusion, but not raised in the
case—or 2j(5) and (6) applied. 2l excludes “ ‘[p]roperty damage’ to
‘your work’ arising out of it or any part of it and included in the
103
‘products-completed operations hazard.’ ”
The products-completed
operations hazard to which 2l refers is defined as “property damage”
104
except “work that has not yet been completed or abandoned.”
Through the products-completed operations hazard, it becomes clear that
105
2l presides over completed operations.
Unlike 2l, 2j(5)’s phrase “are
106
performing operations” narrows 2j(5) to only ongoing operations.
Distinguishing between 2l and 2j(6) is done through the “products107
completed operations hazard.”
2j(6), commonly known as the “faulty
108
workmanship” exclusion, contains the disclaimer that coverage “does
not apply to ‘property damage’ included in the ‘products-completed
109
operations hazard.’ ”
Putting these two negatives together, 2j(6) is at
issue only for ongoing operations. Thus a central difference between 2l
and 2j(5) and (6) is one of timing: whether the damage occurred from
110
ongoing or completed operations.
When did the damage in Thommes happen? If Thommes started
clearing the Krajewskis’ land at the same time it was clearing the
development’s land, or before it had finished clearing the development’s
land, 2j(5) and (6) would apply because the damage would have occurred
while operations were ongoing—the work itself would be the damage.
However, if Thommes had finished doing all the work on the
103. GCL Policy, supra note 7.
104. Id.
105. See Schultz, supra note 34, at 271.
106. O’Connor, Liability Coverage, supra note 78, at 8. See also Spears v. Smith,
690 N.E.2d 557, 559 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (exclusion 2j(5) does not apply to damages
discovered after the work has been completed because the exclusion is written in the
present tense); Houston Bldg. Serv., Inc. v. Amer. Gen. Fire & Cas. Co., 799 S.W.2d 308,
311 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990); Franco, supra note 13, at 796. In Action Auto Stores, Inc. v.
United Capitol Ins. Co., a court rejected an insurer’s attempt to argue that 2j(5)’s phrase
“if the ‘property damage’ arises out of those operations” meant that the exclusion applies
to completed operations. 845 F. Supp. 428, 434 (W.D. Mich. 1993).
107. CGL Policy, supra note 7.
108. O’Connor, Liability Coverage, supra note 78, at 8.
109. CGL Policy, supra note 7.
110. Compare CGL exclusion 2l with exclusions 2j(5) and 2j(6).
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development’s land and only then started working on the Krajewskis’
property, a third-party property, then its work would have been
considered complete under Definition 14b(1)—“When all of the work
111
called for in your contract has been completed.”
In effect, Thommes’
work would be considered complete when Thommes finished doing the
work called for in the contract, not the work Thommes thought was
called for in the contract.
112
From the statements available, the sequence of Thommes’ work
is not entirely clear. As detailed above, Benick recalled that Thommes
started working on the Krajewskis’ property “about halfway” through its
113
work.
This accounting indicates that the damage was discovered
while operations were still ongoing. However, while Benick’s statement
records the discussions that went on after the damage was discovered, it
makes no mention of having more work left to complete on the
114
development’s property.
Still, the insurer did choose 2j(5) and 2j(6)
as the exclusions by which to deny coverage, thereby suggesting that
115
damages did occur during Thommes’ operations.
The timing of the damage warrants investigation because, at first
glance, it is a surprise that the business risk doctrine comes up at all in
connection with 2j(5) and (6). In the article that originally formulated
the business risk doctrine, Henderson asserts that the risk intended to be
insured is the possibility that the insured’s work will cause tort liability
116
to a third party “once relinquished or completed.”
On the face of it,
then, the business risk doctrine should not apply in Thommes as it
involved an ongoing operation.
Indeed, at least one court, when faced with a CGL ongoing
operation exclusion, incorporated the business risk doctrine that led to an
outright contradiction in its holding. In Glens Falls Insurance Co. v.
111. CGL Policy, supra note 7.
112. See handwritten statement of Thomas Benick, Partner of Thommes & Thomas,
Concerning the HHA Project (July 11, 1998), Thommes v. Milwaukee Ins. Co., 641
N.W.2d 877 (Minn. 2002) (No. C9-00-1393); handwritten statement of Gary Dawson,
Agent for RKI, Concerning the HHA Project (August 5, 1998), Thommes v. Milwaukee
Ins. Co., 641 N.W.2d 877 (Minn. 2002) (No. C9-00-1393).
113. Handwritten statement of Thomas Benick, Partner of Thommes & Thomas,
Concerning the HHA Project, dated July 11, 1998, Thommes v. Milwaukee Ins. Co., 641
N.W.2d 877 (Minn. 2002) (No. C9-00-1393).
114. Id.
115. Thommes, 622 N.W.2d at 160. The court of appeals took it as settled that
Thommes damaged the Krajewskis’ property “in the course of clearing” the
development’s property. Id.
116. Henderson, supra note 18, at 441 (emphasis added).
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Donmac Golf Shaping Co., Inc., the Georgia Court of Appeals dealt with
117
After a contractor
a fact situation strikingly similar to Thommes.
completed construction of a golf course, the developer discovered that
118
substantial parts of it had been built on federally protected wetlands.
In effect, the contractor had built on a third party’s property and, as the
court put it, this construction “obviously occurred contemporaneously
119
with the work being performed on the project.”
Like the court in
Thommes, the Georgia Court of Appeals ultimately held that 2j(5) and
(6) did not work to exclude coverage because the damages were “beyond
120
the scope of the contractual expectations” in tort.
Nevertheless, the
court’s restatement of the business risk doctrine by which it justified its
decision, taken as usual from Weedo, was that “[t]he risk intended to be
insured is the possibility that the . . . work of the insured, once
relinquished or completed, will cause . . . damage to property other than
121
to the . . . completed work itself.”
It escaped the court that a doctrine
contingent on the existence of completed work cannot be applied to a
122
fact situation involving contemporaneous work.
The “once relinquished or completed” language perplexed both
sides in Thommes. In its brief to the supreme court, Milwaukee argued
that “[a] review of the law review article giving rise to the adoption of
the business risk doctrine in Minnesota, as well as the New Jersey
decision cited extensively by [the supreme court] when it adopted the
doctrine . . .” revealed that the court of appeals had misinterpreted this
123
illustrative phrase.
Namely, Milwaukee argued that the first line of
the oft-quoted passage by Henderson in Weedo contains the “critical
124
qualification” that coverage applies only after the work is complete.
To buttress its argument, Milwaukee then asserted that no coverage for
117. 417 S.E.2d 197 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992).
118. Id. at 198.
119. Id. at 199.
120. Id. at 201.
121. Id. at 200 (emphasis added).
122. Though not directly dealing with the ongoing operations exclusions of 2j(5) and
(6), Knutson also could be considered to have an internal contradiction. Although
Knutson contains the Henderson quotation, “once relinquished or completed,” the court
later talks about a CGL policy being intended to cover third-party damage from both
completed operations and also during the course of the insured’s work. Knutson, 396
N.W.2d at 234. See also Weaver v. Drew, No. 96-0454, 1996 WL 588060, *3 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1996) (discussing 2j(6) exclusion while relying on precedent that quotes “once
relinquished or completed” passage).
123. Appellant’s Brief at 25, Thommes v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 641 N.W.2d 877
(Minn. 2002) (No. C9-00-1393) [hereinafter Appellant’s Brief].
124. Id. at 26.
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ongoing operations “dovetails with the purpose of the business risk
doctrine . . .” because an insured “can control the risks to third-party
125
property” while on the job.
“[T]he insured is present and can control
126
his or her actions,” whereas later, an insured has “less control.”
Milwaukee even cited the Weedo pronouncement that CGL insurance
“does not cover an accident of faulty workmanship but rather faulty
127
workmanship which causes an accident” in support of its position.
In its responding brief, Thommes asserted that Milwaukee’s
128
argument failed because it was internally inconsistent.
Thommes
argued that the nature of Milwaukee’s argument conceded that there
could be coverage to third-party property arising from completed work,
129
if not ongoing work.
However, according to Thommes, if the court
adopted Milwaukee’s definition of “your work”—a phrase contained in
the exclusions 2j(6) and 2l—then the court would never grant coverage
130
for completed operations.
Thommes concluded that Milwaukee’s
point had to be rejected because never granting coverage was an
131
Thommes was responding to the fact that insureds
impossibility.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 26-27.
127. Id. at 27 (quoting Weedo, 405 A.2d at 796). If Milwaukee had prevailed on its
point of a literal reading of Henderson, it only would have created future problems. The
business risk doctrine is founded on the concept that an insured should not receive
coverage for damages arising from business risks that were within its own control.
O’Connor, supra note 11, at 15. To realize this principle, courts have developed the
practice of ruling no coverage for damages arising from a contract with a first-party
property and for coverage for damages arising from tort suffered by a third party. Dotseth
et al., supra note 7, at 601. In order to see Milwaukee’s argument through to a logical
conclusion, courts would have to create a distinction between torts that (1) arise in the
course of the insured’s work, and (2) those that arise from work after it is completed.
The artificiality of this distinction is indicative of the criticism commentators have made
of the business risk doctrine overall. The doctrine covers tort claims under CGL policies,
but not contract claims, even though both can arise from negligent behavior. See
generally Dotseth et al., supra note 7. And yet, a tort is a tort is a tort—a wrong or
breach of duty, regardless of when it occurs. See BLACK’S, supra note 2, at 1496.
Negligence is theoretically a wrong that can be avoided, regardless of the degree of
control one has over the tortious behavior. Even when damages arise after work is
completed, the wrongful act that led to damage still must have occurred during the course
of work. Only the extent of damages can vary. See 7 COUCH ON INSURANCE § 102:23.
See also O’Connor, Liability Coverage, supra note 78, at 14. If the court had addressed
Milwaukee’s argument, such a reading would not have satisfied the business risk
doctrine.
128. Respondent’s Brief at 22-23, Thommes v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 641
N.W.2d 877 (Minn. 2002) (No. C9-00-1393) [hereinafter Respondent’s Brief].
129. Id. at 22.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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generally want a court to use as narrow a definition of “your work” as
132
possible to make the corresponding exclusion as narrow as possible.
Through the briefs from both sides in Thommes, the supreme court
must have been aware of the dispute over timing. Yet strangely,
nowhere in the opinion does the supreme court comment on this
difference from Henderson, which had been quoted verbatim in earlier
133
decisions.
Even though the explanation for the phrase “once
relinquished or completed” lay there to be discovered, Henderson had
134
been quoted out of context in previous court decisions.
The full
passage from which Henderson’s oft-quoted language was plucked is one
135
in which he is not discussing the business risk doctrine overall.
Instead, he is specifically discussing the “products hazard and completed
operations” provision (today’s “products-completed operations
136
hazard”).
Again, it is the products-completed operations hazard that
limits 2l’s application to completed work, completely distinct from 2j(5)
137
and (6) exclusions that apply to ongoing operations.
When Henderson
wrote of the “risk intended to be insured” that precedes the “once
relinquished or completed” phrase, he was writing about the risk to be
insured by the products-completed operations hazard, not the business
138
risk doctrine generally.
Instead of proposing to limit CGL coverage to
damages that arise after work is complete, Henderson was narrowly
discussing a provision that, by its own terms, was confined to damages
139
having arisen after completed work.
132. 4 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 3, at § 11:43.
133. See, e.g, Bor-Son Bldg. Corp. v. Employers Commercial Union Ins. Co. of Am.,
323 N.W.2d 58, 62 (Minn. 1982); Knutson Constr. Co. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins.
Co., 396 N.W.2d 229, 235 (Minn. 1986). There is at least one decision from the court of
appeals, though dealing with different versions of exclusions, that preceded the supreme
court’s position in Thommes. See Western World Ins. Co. v. H.D. Eng’g Design &
Erection Co., 419 N.W.2d 630 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988). The Western World decision
involved employees of a subcontractor who negligently placed materials on top of a
partially completed building and caused it to collapse. Id. at 631. The court of appeals
found the effect of the business risk doctrine in Western World distinguishable from BorSon and Knutson. Id. at 635. The court held that the subcontractor’s insurer had a duty
to defend and indemnify because the damages arose from tort liability to a third party. Id.
The court reached this decision despite the fact that the actions giving rise to the liability
occurred while the work was still in progress. Id. at 631. The Western World decision
did not comment on timing.
134. See supra notes 105-10 and accompanying text.
135. Henderson, supra note 18, at 441.
136. See CGL Policy, supra note 7.
137. Id.
138. Henderson, supra note 18, at 441.
139. Id.
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The ritualized quoting of Henderson that has omitted this language
ever after is part of Weedo’s lasting legacy, demonstrating the perils of
taking key passages of another decision wholesale. Henderson stated
elsewhere in his article that “there are no tenable distinctions [in whether
140
to grant coverage] between errors in planning and production.”
When,
according to Henderson, “liability is imposed on the fault basis of
141
negligence, the standard is one of ordinary care in each situation.”
From Henderson’s perspective, the timing of the damages would only be
a factor like any other in determining what is ordinary care, not
something that precluded coverage altogether. In speaking of the
products hazard and completed operations provision, Henderson’s point
was to show that the impulse behind the provision was in keeping with
its historical forerunner, the “premises and operations” provision that
142
provided coverage for ongoing operations.
If Henderson considered
the current form for exclusions 2j(5) and (6), his reasoning would lead
him to concur with Thommes that if an insured’s work may give rise to
tort liability to third parties, then a CGL policy should provide coverage
143
without regard to timing.
Thus, Milwaukee was correct that the
meaning of the “once relinquished or completed” passage changed when
the first sentence was restored to its rightful place, just not in the way
144
that it hoped.
The Minnesota Supreme Court skipped a step in reasoning when it
failed to convey that it was dropping the “once relinquished or
completed” qualification from its understanding of the business risk
145
doctrine.
Nevertheless, the absence of any timing qualification did
allow the court to avoid an outright contradiction between the business
risk doctrine’s formulation and application. Knutson’s aside about
coverage during the course of an insured’s work does perhaps suggest
that the court had it clear for itself that CGL coverage applied without
140. Id. at 440.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 417. The premises and operations provision is intended to cover “injuries
to third persons arising out of conditions or activities on or near [an insured’s] premises
and for operations away from such premises but related thereto.” Id.
143. Id. at 418. Henderson has detailed the distinction between exclusions based on
timing in a passage on the history of CGL insurance. Id. The distinction is a function of
the premises and operations provision having originated before, and being sold separately
from, the products-completed operations hazard. Id.
144. See Appellant’s Brief, supra note 123, at 25.
145. Thommes, 641 N.W.2d at 881. The Thommes court merely wrote that the risk
intended to be insured by CGL policies is the risk that an insured’s work will cause
property damage to third-party property and may give rise to tort liability. Id.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss2/12

20

Solon: Contracts—Beating Them at Their Own Game: The Business Risk Doctr
12 SOLON- PAGINATED.DOC

2003]

1/13/2004 3:45 PM

BEATING THEM AT THEIR OWN GAME

693

146

regard to timing.
Whatever the case, the path from Bor-Son to
Thommes only becomes clear after one considers the business risk
doctrine in its original context. Thus, although Thommes does not
announce that it has revised the business risk doctrine, a revised
formulation still emerges from it, and one that states what the court
actually thinks: the risk intended to be insured is that which may give
147
rise to tort liability to third parties.
B. Trying to Have It Both Ways
As a missing step, not a misstep, in the supreme court’s reasoning,
the above analysis does not affect the court’s ultimate holding.
Reconstructing this step, however, does reveal the incremental way in
which the court has refined the business risk doctrine from Bor-Son to
Thommes, possibly to the cast that the court is willing to see brought
before it in the future. By not discarding a doctrine that some have
148
criticized, Thommes in essence recommitted Minnesota to the business
risk doctrine framework. However, the Minnesota courts’ present
handling of the business risk doctrine precludes it from ever being fully
realized.
As the Thommes court itself declared, the interpretation of an
149
insurance contract must be decided as a matter of law, not fact.
The
purported operating principle behind the business risk doctrine used to
interpret an insurance contract—that one should receive coverage only
for unavoidable damages—should make coverage depend on whether an
150
insured has committed a tort.
After all, a tort is an avoidable
151
consequence that arises through unreasonable behavior.
In Minnesota,
courts have ruled that, of the spectrum of torts, a CGL policy may cover
152
Negligence alone does not
negligence, but not intentional torts.
153
necessarily make an action fall within a CGL policy’s scope.
Yet, as
146. 396 N.W.2d at 234.
147. 641 N.W.2d at 881.
148. See O’Connor, supra note 11, at 18; 4 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 3, at §
11:37.
149. 641 N.W.2d at 879.
150. O’Connor, supra note 11, at 15.
151. BLACK’S, supra note 2, at 1496.
152. See, e.g., Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Terrace Enter., Inc., 260 N.W.2d 450, 453
(Minn. 1997).
153. W. Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Frost Paint & Oil Corp., No. C3-97-1118, 1998 WL
27247, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 1998) (stating that “faulty workmanship alone does
not constitute an occurrence”). A CGL policy defines an occurrence as “an accident,
including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful
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with other torts, determining negligence is primarily a question of fact.
Thus, bringing the business risk doctrine to its complete realization
intrinsically involves deciding some question of fact.
If material facts are deemed not in dispute, as in a summary
judgment decision, a court should in theory be able to attribute to them
155
their legal significance and decide the case as a matter of law.
If,
furthermore, a court ascribes to the business risk doctrine, it would
appear that whether an insured received coverage would hinge on a
court’s determination of whether the insured was negligent. Yet
Thommes, through a review of a summary judgment of what is in essence
156
never mentioned whether the facts had to be
a negligence claim,
viewed in the light more favorable to one claimant rather than the
157
other.
This absence is in keeping with a court that does not feel the
need to decide whether an insured has been negligent.
It is only to be expected that as a case rises through the appeals
process, the substantive legal issues rise to the fore, while the facts
158
recede into the background.
Still, it is beneficial to compare what
facts the court of appeals found worthy of mention versus the supreme
court. The court of appeals stated:
Before [Thommes’] employees commenced clearing, Dean
Morlock pointed out a tree marking the property line up to
which appellant was to cut and clear trees. When asked
whether certain brush and trees were on the adjacent property,
Morlock told [Thommes’] employees not to worry because his
sister owned the property. [Thommes’] employees cleared the
trees as instructed, but later learned they had destroyed trees on
159
the Krajewski property.
conditions.” CGL Policy, supra note 7.
154. Glatt v. Feist, 156 N.W.2d 819, 823 (N.D. 1968).
155. 73 AM. JUR. 2D Appellate Review § 37 (2001). “If there are no questions of fact,
the court applies the law in accordance with the admitted facts.” Id.
156. 73 AM. JUR. 2D Summary Judgment § 8 (2001). “Summary judgment is not
usually as feasible in negligence cases as in other kinds of litigation because issues of
negligence . . . are not ordinarily susceptible of summary adjudication for or against the
plaintiff or claimant.” Id.
157. Thommes, 641 N.W.2d at 879. Instead, the Thommes court wrote: “On a review
of a summary judgment, this court determines whether there are any genuine issues of
material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the law . . . . The parties in
this case agree as to the material facts.” Id.
158. 5 AM. JUR. 2D Appellate Review § 662 (1995). Generally speaking, “an appellate
court does not reweigh the evidence presented in the court below.” Id.
159. Thommes v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 622 N.W.2d 155, 157 (Minn. Ct. App.
2001), aff’d, 641 N.W.2d 877 (Minn. 2002).
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The court of appeals included enough facts to make Thommes’
160
In contrast, the supreme court’s decision
behavior appear reasonable.
touched only briefly on the facts: “Complying with Morlock’s
instructions as to the area to be cleared and grubbed, Thommes cleared
and grubbed approximately one-half acre of the Krajewskis’ land . . . .
That land was not a part of the HHA property and the Krajewskis did not
161
consent to it being cleared and grubbed.”
The supreme court’s facts
perhaps give the impression that Thommes was not negligent. Yet the
relative lack of factual background in the supreme court’s decision
suggests that the supreme court did not want to appear swayed by the
facts, one way or the other.
Despite the supreme court’s pronouncement that “the material facts”
162
were undisputed, both Thommes and Milwaukee took the opportunity
in their briefs to dispute those facts. The dispute centered on whether
Thommes had been negligent, even though a settlement had already been
reached between Thommes and the Krajewskis by the time their dispute
163
came up on appeal.
For instance, in its brief, Milwaukee asserted that
“[t]here is no dispute that Respondent [Thommes] had the ability to
demand a survey from the general contractor or perform one at its own
164
expense to establish boundaries.”
Thommes countered in its own brief
165
that “[t]his ‘fact’ has not been established.”
All of this suggests that the facts do matter. The court had Benick’s
statement available to it. Perhaps the court in Thommes unconsciously
wanted to provide coverage for an insured that it did not consider
negligent. There has been no harm in the Thommes case because it does
not appear that the insured was negligent. But it is unclear that the
supreme court will handle a future case in the same way as Thommes if it
feels that an insured has been negligent.
An alternative to the approach adopted by Minnesota courts may be
available. In Utility Maintenance Contractors, Inc. v. West American
Insurance Co., the Kansas Court of Appeals decided its own CGL
166
coverage case.
The city of Offerle hired Utility, a contractor insured
160. Id. at 157.
161. Thommes, 641 N.W.2d at 879.
162. Id. at 878.
163. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 128, at 32. The Krajewskis’ complaint had
requested damages of $35,000. Id. Thommes settled the Krajewskis’ claim for $15,000.
Id.
164. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 123, at 4.
165. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 128, at 4.
166. 866 P.2d 1093 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994). Another case that decided the issue of
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by West American, to remove a sewage clog in the city sewer line.
To
remove the clog, Utility used a root cutter, which traveled over a hundred
168
feet to reach the problem site.
Because a bolt fell off while traveling
in the line, the root cutter was defective and caused damage to the
169
sewer.
As one of its defenses to providing coverage, the insurance
170
company raised exclusion 2j(5).
While the court agreed with the
insurer to bar coverage for the 115 feet of sewer line the root cutter had
to travel to reach the clog site, the court decided differently for any
171
damage past it.
The court reasoned that:
[a]ny damage that occurred beyond the clog site . . . may be
excluded by section 2.J.(5), depending upon a factual showing
on remand that it was the usual and necessary practice under
similar circumstances to use the cutter beyond the initial point
172
in the line where the clog is first noted.
173
By asking what is “the usual and necessary practice,” the court
converted the question of coverage for any damage past 115 feet into a
fact question.
Unlike Thommes, the damages in Utility occurred on the customer’s
174
own property, not that of a third party.
Normally, a court following
the business risk doctrine would decide the situation in Utility as a
175
contract issue across the board, rather than tort.
In Utility, it is unclear
whether the court is consciously trying to follow the business risk
176
Yet whether on the contract or tort side of the
doctrine or not.
coverage as a fact question is Doerr v. Mobil Oil Corp., 774 So. 2d 119 (La. 2000).
Doerr involved water contaminated by an oil refinery’s pollution, and determination of
the coverage issue depended on how a pollution exclusion was interpreted. 774 So. 2d at
122-23. The court ruled that the determination of key terms, such as polluter, pollutant,
and discharge, had to be decided by the trier of fact. Id. at 135-37.
167. Utility, 866 P.2d at 1095.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1097.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Compare Thommes, 641 N.W.2d at 877 with Utility, 866 P.2d at 1093.
175. See, e.g., Thommes, 641 N.W.2d 889 (recognizing that “it is well established
that general contract principles govern the construction of insurance policies . . .”).
176. Utility, 866 P.2d at 1096. The Utility decision never names the business risk
doctrine. However, the court does include reasoning along the lines mentioned in
Thommes, noting that the two types of risk involved for an insured contractor are: (1) the
risk that “is in the warranties that arise under the contract,” and (2) the risk of “tort
liability for ‘injury to people and damage to property other than the work performed.’ ”
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business risk doctrine’s distinction, this case still carries implications for
a case like Thommes. As a case on the business risk doctrine’s contract
side, the Kansas Court of Appeals could have used the business risk
doctrine’s distinction between contract and tort to deny coverage out of
177
hand, as Minnesota courts did in Bor-Son and Knutson.
The
significance of the Utility analysis for the Thommes court is that the
178
Utility court allowed a fact question to decide the issue of coverage.
A court could follow Utility’s lead to make coverage in tort situations
also dependent on a fact inquiry.
The Thommes court has hedged the predicament of reconciling a
type of claim that must be decided as a matter of law to another that must
be decided as a question of fact. In Thommes, the court wrote that CGL
policies are intended to insure against risk that may give rise to tort
179
liability to third parties.
Yet if courts are to dictate coverage on the
basis of what may give rise to tort liability, without regard to whether an
insured was negligent, what is the point of bothering about the business
risk doctrine at all? The business risk doctrine is seen as the great
180
weapon of the insurance industry.
However, deciding coverage
without a fact inquiry—which ensures that coverage is not a factdependent outcome—removes the possibility for the business risk
doctrine to work at all. As in Thommes, courts will be able to find a
CGL insurance contract “ambiguous” and construe its terms against the
Id. (quoting Owings v. Gifford, 697 P.2d 865, 869 (Kan. 1985)).
177. See Bor-Son Bldg. Corp. v. Employers Commercial Union Ins. Co. of Am., 323
N.W.2d 58, 62 (Minn. 1982) (stating that “since the alleged building damages were the
result of alleged breach of contract, there was no duty” on the insurer to defend its
insured); Knutson Constr. Co. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 396 N.W.2d 229, 235
(Minn. 1986) (“[T]he CGL policy does not provide coverage for claims of defective
materials and workmanship giving rise to a claim for damage to the property itself which
is the subject matter of the construction project.”).
178. Utility, 866 P.2d at 1097.
179. Thommes, 641 N.W.2d at 881. Currently, the law tries to relieve the insured of
an obligation to prove any requisite facts in order to obtain a defense. See 4 BRUNER &
O’CONNOR, supra note 3, at § 11:20 (discussing the duty to defend). Thus, one attraction
of the supreme court’s approach in Thommes could be that coverage for what may give
rise to tort liability avoids giving an insurer grounds to evade its duty to defend its
insured. That is, if one could get CGL coverage only if non-negligent, a circular inquiry
could develop in which an insured would need a trial to demonstrate that its insurer
should defend. Of course, that is not too far off from what happened in Thommes, what
with the insured Thommes having to go to court against its insurer to gain the duty to
indemnify.
180. See O’Connor, supra note 11, at 15 (characterizing the business risk doctrine as
a “tried and true weapon” of the insurance industry, even to the point of defeating the
plain words in a CGL insurance policy).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2003

25

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 12
12 SOLON- PAGINATED.DOC

698

1/13/2004 3:45 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:2
181

drafter as long as the damage occurs on a third party’s property.
V. CONCLUSION

To reach a seemingly novel decision for providing coverage, the
Thommes court simply returned to the sources of CGL insurance. By
examining the troublesome phrase “once relinquished or completed” in
its original context, it becomes apparent that Thommes reveals that the
business risk doctrine does not have a restrictive timing distinction.
Instead, the way timing interplays with a CGL policy’s coverage depends
on which provisions an insured has specifically purchased. However
successful Thommes’ revisitation of the doctrine is, the business risk
doctrine still contains the intrinsic problem of having to decide a
question of fact as matter of law. Perhaps the court is satisfied that its
rendition of the business risk doctrine—coverage for third-party tort
damages for which one may be found liable—sufficiently mitigates the
paradox.
Insurance companies originally propagated the business risk
182
doctrine before the courts as a way to narrow coverage.
And, indeed,
183
this is what happened in such landmark Minnesota cases as Bor-Son
184
and Knutson, because of this self-same business risk doctrine. In the
end, however, the intent behind the doctrine, as the Minnesota Supreme
Court understood it, has allowed an insured like Thommes to beat the
insurers at their own game.

181.
182.
183.
184.

641 N.W.2d at 883.
See O’Connor, Liability Coverage, supra note 78, at 8-9.
323 N.W.2d at 63.
396 N.W.2d at 235.
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